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“No Responsibility and No Rice”: The Rise and Fall of Agricultural
Collectivization in Vietnam

Journal of Agricultural History 82, 1 (2008)
CHAD RAYMOND

Communist leaders in Vietnam attempted to use agricultural collectivization to transform
a poor, agrarian country into a modern, socialist nation with an industrialized economy.
Collectivized agricultural production lacked sufficient economic incentives for Vietnamese
farmers; they preferred to produce privately for household consumption or the free
market. State-initiated reforms to collectivize agriculture failed to improve the
performance of the agricultural sector and eventually the Vietnamese Communist Party
was forced to abandon collectivization altogether. Once farmers were freed from
collective labor and could pursue private production for the free market, Vietnam’s
agricultural output skyrocketed.

CHAD RAYMOND is an assistant professor of political science at Salve Regina
University in Newport, Rhode Island. This paper is based on field research in Vietnam
that was made possible by a fellowship from the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii.

In the early 1950s Vietnamese communist revolutionaries formulated grand plans to use
collectivization to transform a poor, agrarian society into a modern, socialist nation with
a nationalized economy. The bulk of Vietnam’s population lived in rural areas, which
were also the center of most of the country’s economic activity. Industrial production
was limited and an urban proletariat was almost nonexistent. Any fundamental change
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to Vietnamese society would have to begin in the countryside and Vietnamese
communists chose collectivization as the instrument of change. Though the organization
of collective production evolved from its inception in the early 1950s to its end in the
late 1980s, the overriding goal of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) during this
period was to create a system of collective agricultural production under state control.
Despite its cooperative form, the attitudes of individuals undermined collective efforts.1
Vietnam, in fact, possessed several characteristics that should have made its
agricultural sector suitable for collectivization. The VCP began its revolutionary struggle
in the 1940s with substantial rural support, thereby granting the party significant
legitimacy among the rural population. The party used this legitimacy over subsequent
decades to defeat French, American, Chinese, and Cambodian invaders. Furthermore,
during communist rule--since 1954 in northern Vietnam and 1975 in southern Vietnam-no significant organized internal opposition has threatened the regime with
counterrevolution. The ability of the regime to survive, even after the collapse of
communism in the West, indicates that the state has enjoyed a certain level of political
power over Vietnamese society, power that should have enabled the state to direct the
form and substance of agricultural production.2
In addition to a favorable political environment, economic factors should have
facilitated increased agricultural production under collectivization. The productivity of
land upon which rice is cultivated can be inexpensively increased by applying more
labor, even in conditions of land scarcity.3 In Vietnam, collectivization tied farmers to
state-created cooperatives through a system of residential registration (ho khau), which
linked cooperative membership with access to food and rural employment and ensured a
large, fixed supply of agricultural labor, even during periods of war. Also, the VCP
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deliberately structured cooperatives to simultaneously increase labor productivity and
dampen consumer demand to hasten the creation of capital needed for industrial
investment. VCP leaders believed that collective labor in cooperatives would be more
rationally allocated and more likely to generate economies of scale than traditional
household-based agricultural production. Pricing state-manufactured and -distributed
consumer goods at an artificially high level, in combination with the state appropriating
a large share of the harvest from cooperatives at below market prices, would generate a
price scissors effect beneficial to the state.
Yet Vietnamese government statistics indicate that per capita agricultural output,
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cultivated land area, and land yields declined during the war against the Americans and
their South Vietnamese allies from 1965 to 1975, which forced North Vietnam to import
15 percent of its food. By the late 1980s, more than a decade after the end of the war,
collectivization still failed to meet the expectations of the VCP. Vietnam remained poor
and unindustrialized, the country’s economy was in crisis, and millions of Vietnamese
suffered from hunger and malnutrition. Faced with the possibility of political unrest, in
1988 the VCP abandoned strict adherence to collectivized production and legalized the
private production that was already occurring on a widespread basis in the countryside.
By 1991 private household enterprise produced 97 percent of Vietnam’s agricultural
goods by value, accounting for nearly 40 percent of the country’s gross domestic
product. In 1992 Vietnam became the world’s third largest exporter of rice.4 Farmers
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who produced little for the state under collective production from the late 1950s through
most of the 1980s were quite able to privately produce surpluses for the free market in
the early 1990s, suggesting that collectivized agriculture lacked sufficient incentives for
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farmers.
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In 1953 VCP leadership decided that favorable conditions existed for proceeding
further with its social revolutionary agenda for North Vietnam. Party leaders believed
that the creation of a socialist society necessitated that a state-managed collective
economy replace private control over land, labor, and the exchange of goods. The
natural place to begin building socialism was the countryside, as it contained the bulk of
Vietnam’s population and most of the country’s economic activity. Although many rural
areas were not yet under permanent control of the VCP in 1953, the military situation
against the French colonial regime had improved greatly since the war for independence
began in 1945, and the need for a broad, united-front strategy that minimized
antagonizing North Vietnam’s upper class while trying to maximize popular support
against the French had lessened. It is also probable that VCP leaders recognized the
need to consolidate the party’s position among the poorest residents of the countryside,
who had suffered greatly during the war against the French, and whose socioeconomic
conditions had not improved.5
Since the beginning of the anti-colonial war, communist policies designed to
benefit the rural poor had consisted mainly of measures such as rent and tax reductions,
debt annulments, and the periodic redistribution of village-held communal lands.
However, the basic structure of landownership had not changed significantly. The VCP
calculated that in 1953 individuals classified as landlords and rich peasants composed 3
percent of the rural population, but owned almost 22 percent of the land. Poor farmers
owned about 51.8 percent of the land but, together with the landless, formed 58
percent of the rural population. Assessments of rural poverty based solely on
landownership masked the fundamental problem of overall land scarcity in North
Vietnam. Farmers who employed landless field laborers often did not own large amounts
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of land in absolute terms, and any substantial changes in rural economic structure would
require the appropriation of land from a “large number of peasants with above average
holdings.” An extensive allocation of land to the poor and landless therefore required
that the Communist Party dispossess those classified as “middle peasant[s],” many of
whom had received land from earlier redistributions.6
In December 1953 the VCP leadership enacted the Land Reform Law, which
specified a redistribution of land from individuals the VCP classified as landlords and rich
peasants--who gained most of their income from renting out land or who hired others to
work it--to those Vietnamese the VCP considered to have insufficient landholdings to
provide an adequate income. Local land reform committees appropriated property from
Deleted: [who resisted?]

many farmers, even those with little land. Many farmers were punished or killed
arbitrarily, ultimately forcing VCP leaders to concede in a number of speeches in 1956
that “errors,” excesses,” and “injustices” had occurred during the implementation of land
reform. Despite the considerable social upheaval and widespread violence during land
reform, there is a clear indication of improvement in agricultural production: from 1954
through 1958 the annual per capita production of paddy rice increased by over 60
percent.7
The VCP then launched a drive to consolidate farmers into mutual aid teams
(MATs, to doan ket or to doi cong). In MATs, farmers retained ownership of land and
control of crops but were encouraged to assist each other during periods of peak labor
demand by jointly working in one another’s fields. VCP leaders believed that MATs would
produce greater returns for their members than traditional farming because more hands
would be working the same field, which would--in theory--raise output. Farmers in MATs
were compensated as a group for their pooled labor. A MAT’s harvest was parceled out
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to each team member at the end of a growing season, so the returns earned by each
MAT member depended on the actions of other MAT members and were not under the
full control of the individual. To maximize their returns and minimize losses, MAT
members expended valuable time and effort to monitor the work of others or
participated as minimally as possible in MAT projects, making them unpopular among
farmers. The number of MATs peaked at over 150,000 in mid-1956; however, a year
later the number decreased to less than half because many households had returned to
their traditional ad-hoc method of exchanging labor only during the harvest. According
to official reports, farmers were “uninterested” in maintaining MATs on a year-round
basis, and as a result MATs in and of themselves appear to have made little to no
positive effect on crop production.8
On the heels of MATs came a campaign to create agricultural production
cooperatives (hop tac xa san xuat nong nghiep), which obligated farmers to perform
collective labor and fulfill procurement quotas imposed by central authorities. Farmers in
cooperatives were organized into production brigades (doi san xuat) under the oversight
of brigade leadership committees and the cooperative’s committees for management
(ban chu nhiem or ban quan ly) and inspection (ban kiem tra). Managers awarded
workpoints (cong diem) to brigade members for their collective labor and were worth a
portion of the cooperative’s net harvest. Brigade leaders were responsible for recording
the workpoints earned by the brigade’s members. The leaders were originally ordered to
assign workpoints according to the difficulty and quality of collective labor performed for
the cooperative by brigade members, but uneducated and unskilled cadres rapidly found
it impossible to differentiate between the work performed by hundreds of cooperative
members. Cadres soon awarded a fixed number of workpoints to cooperative members
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based solely on the time spent performing collective labor, a method of compensation
that “rewards neither effort nor skill, but it is straightforward to administer.” Because the
cooperative paid farmers solely according to the time each member performing
collective labor, they were not penalized on an individual basis for poor-quality work.
Farmers saw no incentive to work harder than their neighbors and shirked collective
labor as much as possible.9
A variety of factors further reduced the rewards of collective labor in the
cooperatives. State purchase prices for agricultural goods from the cooperatives during
the 1960s were less than a third of market prices in North Vietnam. Cooperatives also
bore the cost of an inefficient, top-heavy administrative bureaucracy that was often
corrupt, while participating farmers were paid only after the cooperative had received
the costs of production and fulfilled state quotas. As a result, per capita grain
production in North Vietnam steadily declined during the 1960s and 1970s. From 1961
to 1975 North Vietnam’s annual per capita paddy rice production dropped from 269 to
194 kilograms, as shown in Figure 1.10
When the VCP established agricultural production cooperatives in North Vietnam
it permitted rural households to privately produce some crops on small plots of land.
These lands were called “5 percent” plots (dat nam phan tram), from an April 1959
resolution of the 16th Plenum of the VCP Central Committee that reserved 5 percent of
the arable land within each cooperative’s boundaries for distribution to individual
households. Although the VCP intended collectivized agriculture to supply the “vital
needs” of rice and other staple foods and viewed the 5 percent plots as part of a
supplementary “family economy” (kinh te phu gia dinh), they soon became an important
means for farmers to produce food and income while avoiding collective labor. From the
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early 1960s through the early 1970s, farmers in North Vietnam earned between 60 and
75 percent of their income from the private cultivation of their 5 percent plots. These
plots were not officially allocated any state-supplied resources, yet yields from
household-cultivated gardens were often two or even three times the yield per hectare
of cooperative lands.11
#1
<Figure 1>
War in South Vietnam caused North Vietnam to re-assign many cadres and male
heads of households from agricultural cooperative duties to the military. Though rural
areas enjoyed a labor surplus even during periods of heavy conscription, cooperatives
became more dependent on the actions of those workers--primarily women--who
remained. Similarly, funds previously allocated to the agricultural sector were redirected
to subsidies for heavy industry and the production of defense-related materials.
Cooperatives in the North were expected to produce more with less for both the military
and urban residents.12
In an attempt to meet the state’s wartime procurement demands, some
cooperative managers allowed households to extend their private plots into cooperative
lands in exchange for a percentage of the families’ harvests from these plots. Some
cooperatives disobeyed regulations by forming contracts with individual households that
allowed these households to privately cultivate or raise livestock on cooperative land in
exchange for delivering a quota of crops to the cooperative. These household contracts
(khoan ho) permitted farmers to dispose of any over-quota surplus on the free market.
District officials usually ended these arrangements as soon as they were discovered, but
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in some cases local forms of household contracts became so well entrenched that
abolishing them required intervention by provincial or even national authorities.13
In August of 1974 a major party conference on agriculture was held in Thai Binh.
Le Duan, the general-secretary of the VCP, declared that small-scale, family-organized
farming could not meet Vietnam’s economic needs, despite evidence that private plots
cultivated by households produced much more than the collectively worked fields of
cooperatives, even while being denied state-supplied resources during a time of war. Le
Duan ordered that cooperatives be consolidated and enlarged to redistribute manpower
and reorganize production “better and more rationally.” Official statistics show that
expanding the size of cooperatives did nothing to halt declining rice production in North
Vietnam.14
Though VCP leaders expected the end of the war against the Americans to end
North Vietnam’s economic malaise, the lack of economic growth during the 1960s and
early 1970s continued after South Vietnam’s defeat in 1975. The VCP’s attempt to
collectivize southern Vietnam, especially the highly productive Mekong Delta, did not
allow the state to obtain more crops for use as food, foreign exchange, or investment
capital. As happened in North Vietnam two decades earlier, the VCP initiated land reform
to equalize landholdings in southern Vietnam soon after its victory. In 1976 the VCP
Politburo authorized a land appropriation and redistribution campaign in southern
Vietnam and banned private land sales. The VCP also outlawed the private ownership of
farming equipment, tried to confiscate irrigation pumps, tractors, tillers, and water
buffalo from farmers, and prevented families from raising livestock. Farmers were
classified as poor or rich according to the amount of land they owned, which was reappropriated from those judged to have an excess and redistributed according to
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specific formulae: in the Mekong Delta, families were assigned 0.1 to 0.15 hectares of
rice fields for each working adult and 0.08 to 0.1 hectares for each child under eighteen
or adult over sixty years of age.15
After redistributing land in southern villages, VCP cadres formed production
collectives (tap doan san xuat or to doi san xuat) in the late 1970s as a precursor to fullblown cooperatives. Theoretically, farmers in production collectives voluntarily combined
their labor to collectively cultivate, harvest, and sell crops to the state, all under the
guidance of party cadres, but retained nominal control over their land and its cultivation.
Production collectives differed from cooperatives in that farmers managed them
privately; in cooperatives, the cultivation of crops, the division of labor, and the
distribution of the harvest was bureaucratically managed and the state owned the land.
Farmers who grew crops in production collectives or in cooperatives were
subjected to a food obligation (nghia vu luong thuc) policy that was implemented in
1978 and 1979, which required them to sell a quota of grain to the state at fixed prices
in exchange for state provisions of fertilizer, gasoline, bricks, and consumer goods at
subsidized, below-market prices. When the state initiated the food obligation policy, free
market prices for grain were eight times higher than state prices. State-supplied goods
were usually inferior in quality, insufficient in quantity, and delivered late, which
interrupted planting and thereby hurt production.16
Southern Vietnamese farmers resisted collectivization in a variety of ways. Some
farmers sold land that had been distributed to them by cadres back to previous owners
or refused to perform collective labor. According to the Vietnamese newspaper Nhan

Dan, farmers sold grain at “speculative prices” on the free market that should have been
turned over to the state, and they also used it to distill alcohol and feed hogs. In the
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Mekong Delta, state food procurement decreased by more than half between 1976 and
1979. Farmers wrecked machines and slaughtered livestock before they could be
expropriated by the VCP, and neglected those that became collective property. The
number of functioning tractors in the Mekong Delta declined by 76 percent between
1975 and 1983, and nearly every province in southern Vietnam suffered from a shortage
of draft power by the early 1980s. By the end of 1982, only 0.6 percent of households in
the entire Mekong Delta belonged to cooperatives. Just ten agricultural cooperatives had
been created in Ho Chi Minh City since 1975, and only six new cooperatives had formed
in Ben Tre and Long An provinces. In some areas the number of cooperatives increased
over time merely because they were subdivided into smaller units.17
In November 1981 VCP Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi gave a relatively frank
assessment of collectivization in the South, which he declared had absorbed only “9
percent of peasant families and 7 percent of cultivated land.” Farmers’ free market
transactions made it “impossible” for them to be collectivized; sharecropping, wage
labor, and money-lending were widespread, and cadres had become corrupted and
“misuse[d] their authority to exploit peasants.” The state was never able to collectivize
agricultural production in southern Vietnam, which left it unable to appropriate
significant quantities of grain from southern farmers.18
According to official statistics, Vietnam’s national rice production fell from 11.83
million tons in 1976 to 10.60 million tons in 1977. The following year, production was
even less at 9.79 million tons. In the Mekong Delta, state food procurement decreased
from 950,000 tons in 1976 to only 398,000 tons in 1979. The decline in production
caused serious economic problems for Vietnam, which were compounded by a cessation
of trade with China after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and China’s
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subsequent retaliatory attack against Vietnam’s northern border in 1979; excessive
typhoon rains also destroyed crops in several provinces. Annual per capita rice
production dropped to 157 kilograms in northern Vietnam by 1980, and both the
Mekong and Red River deltas produced less rice per capita than they had at the end of
the war in 1975, as shown in Figure 1.19
While the party proceeded with collectivization in southern Vietnam, national rice
production fell by over 17 percent in the three year period from 1976 to 1978. Food in
northern Vietnam grew increasingly scarce, and so in January 1981 the party’s Central
Committee Secretariat issued Directive 100. Directive 100 permitted farming households
to take over the planting, tending, and harvesting of crops--the labor-intensive phases
of cultivation--on land contracted from cooperatives for one to three years, in exchange
for delivering to the cooperative a specified quantity of grain at each annual harvest.
Though similar to the household contracts that had appeared illegally in the 1960s and
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fertilizers, and pest control services from the cooperatives. Any crops grown in excess of
the quota could be sold by the household to the cooperative at a higher bonus price or
on the free market. Directive 100 indicated that the VCP had “shifted from a focus on
procurement as the priority to a focus on raising production, believing that this would
itself raise procurement.”20
The initial effects of Directive 100 were dramatic, but they did not last. National
rice production increased from 226 kilograms per person in 1981 to 256 in 1982. Annual
harvests of food crops rose from 15.0 million tons of paddy equivalent in 1981 to 17.8
million tons in 1984. State procurement of staple grains soared from 1.4 million tons in
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1979 to almost 3.8 million tons in 1984, enabling the VCP to direct larger supplies of
agricultural products to cities for consumption as food.21
Many Vietnamese farmers took advantage of Directive 100’s provisions in ways
that undercut the VCP’s effort to assert control over agricultural production; for
example, farmers negotiated extremely low contract quotas with cooperatives so that
more grain could be sold at a higher price on the free market. But despite the better
incentives contained within Directive 100, farmers still found private household
production more attractive because of the way in which many cooperatives implemented
the new policy. Cooperatives sometimes arbitrarily raised quotas to force farmers to
cover the cooperative’s operating costs, or they failed to supply agreed-upon services to
household-contracted lands. Others lacked the cash and goods required to purchase
crops from farmers at bonus prices. Cooperative managers also confiscated fields or
attempted to prevent farmers from cultivating previously abandoned land.
One farmers’ representative in Vinh Phu Province complained to government
researchers that crop production after Directive 100 was “still strictly controlled” by
cooperative managers, who were “biased” in the way contracts were distributed. The
allocation of land to households “lacked fairness” and farmers earned an average of only
96 to 144 kilograms of food per year from their contracts with cooperatives. One party
district secretary from Ha Bac Province said that Directive 100 “created discontent
among a majority of farmers” and caused financial problems for cooperatives because
many farmers in the district did not deliver enough produce to meet their contracts.
Official surveys in northern Vietnam revealed that, under Directive 100, farmers were
able to retain only 20 percent of the crop yield after local communist cadres charged for
production costs, taxes, and other fees. The VCP then launched another collectivization

Deleted: [CR: Do you know, and
could you provide a citation, for
how much they should have
earned in kg of food/year?].

14
drive in southern Vietnam, with few practical results. The percentage of rural households
in southern Vietnam that belonged to cooperatives only increased by 1 percent, while
the average size of cooperatives decreased by over 25 percent during the same period.22
In 1985 the VCP promulgated an avalanche of new regulations that were
intended to stimulate the economy but sparked hyperinflation instead. Farmers,
disgruntled by declining incomes earned from collective labor, began to abandon
cooperative fields. National annual rice production declined from 16.0 million tons in
1986 to 15.1 million tons in 1987; in the Mekong Delta, rice production dropped by
nearly 9 percent from approximately 7.1 million tons to less than 6.5 million tons during
the same period. At the beginning of 1988, several provinces in northern Vietnam-including Hanoi--faced food shortages, causing famine that affected approximately 40
percent of the northern rural population. Severe hunger threatened more than 3.5
million individuals. In May the Vietnamese Army newspaper reported that eight of
Vietnam’s nineteen northern provinces were hit by famine, where many people went
without food for weeks.23
Faced with severe shortfalls in grain deliveries to the state and the growing
threat of famine, the party began to encourage private, family-based production in the
late 1980s. This change, along with other economic reforms instituted during this
period, became known as Doi Moi or “renovation.” New policies began to emerge in
November of 1986 when the Council of Ministers approved Resolution 146, which urged
cooperatives to allocate unused land to individual households for family use. For the first
time, the government allowed farmers to privately raise livestock without limits.
However, households were prohibited from privately working the fields that were listed
in the production plans of state farms, cooperatives, and production collectives, even if
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the land was idle--thus, most farmland was technically still subject to collective
production.
Real reform came on April 5, 1988, with the release of the Politburo’s Resolution
10. Resolution 10 formally abolished the requirement that farmers perform collective
labor for the state. Though cooperatives continued to exist under Resolution 10,
households in them were granted responsibility for all phases of cultivation, and farmers
gained the right to either sell crops to the state at negotiated prices or to private
individuals and merchants at market rates. Tenure on land contracted from cooperatives
was extended from three to fifteen years. In addition, the cooperatives lost their
monopoly on the provisioning of plowing, seeds, irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides,
and farmers could now choose to purchase these services from the cooperative if they
wished or from private suppliers.
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Agricultural productivity exploded once farmers were free to engage in private
production. Vietnam’s production of rice increased from less than 242 kilograms per
person in 1987 to 293 kilograms per person in 1989. Vietnamese rice exports more than
doubled from 0.91 million tons in 1988 to 1.95 million tons in 1992, despite crop losses
caused by flooding, making Vietnam the world’s third leading exporter of rice, and by
the late 1990s, Vietnam’s rice exports often exceeded three million tons per year.25
At the same time, state involvement in agricultural production shrank drastically
as cooperatives disintegrated. In the Mekong Delta, the number of cooperatives listed in
official statistics decreased by a factor of six from 1990 to 1994, and in the Red River
Delta in northern Vietnam, the number of cooperatives decreased by 36 percent during
the same period. Meanwhile, the number of cadres employed by cooperatives shrank by
as much as 50 percent. Official statistics, comments from farmers about the higher than
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market cost of agricultural goods sold by the state, and an assessment by the Food and
Agricultural Organization all indicate that the rapid growth in agricultural production in
Vietnam after 1988 was “achieved with very little public investment in water control,
agricultural research and extension, or rural market infrastructure.”26
Individuals’ attitudes towards collectivization also reveal why private production
was successful. I interviewed twenty-three individuals in 1996 to assess the attitude of
farmers in northern Vietnam toward collectivized production and their reactions to its
collapse. During the same year, I conducted follow-up interviews with eight individuals,
and three were interviewed a third time as well. The interviews were semi-structured, a
technique that has been shown to be methodologically sound when used by foreign
researchers in situations where participant observation is not possible. All interview
subjects except one belonged to households where agriculture provided the primary
source of income, and subjects had varied levels of economic status. Interview subjects
ranged in age from early twenties to early seventies; some subjects were identifiable as
members of the VCP and some were military veterans, or their spouses, who had fought
during the war against the Americans.27
The first interview site was a rice-growing village in a rural district within Hanoi’s
boundaries, across the Red River from the city’s urban center. The village had no
industrial enterprises except for a few family-operated brick-making kilns, and
widespread underemployment. The second interview site was an island in the Red River
itself, accessible from Hanoi by a bridge limited to bicycle and foot traffic or by rowboat.
The land on the island was administered jointly by People’s Committees of precincts on
either shore of the river, and rented out by these committees to farmers who migrated
annually from villages in the Red River delta to grow vegetable crops on the island’s
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land. The island had no irrigation and suffered monsoon flooding and dry season
drought. The third interview site was a rice-growing village approximately one-hour’s
drive south of Hanoi. All interviews were conducted entirely in Vietnamese without the
assistance of an interpreter or the prior authorization of government officials. Responses
to interview questions were recorded by means of contemporaneous note-taking. Names
of interview subjects have been omitted to protect their anonymity.
The farmers old enough to remember collectivization in the 1960s and 1970s
describe it as a period of hunger and scarcity and complained of being forced to eat
potatoes and tubers instead of rice, or even chewing betel nut to avoid hunger pangs. A
forty-year-old VCP member, formerly employed by the city of Hanoi but engaged in
raising pigs and cultivating roses for sale on the market, remembered the cooperatives
as having “many work teams (nhieu doi) but there was no responsibility and no rice
(khong co trach nhiem, khong co lua) and living standards were low. We lived by
workpoints but there was little rice (an cong diem ma it com it thoc).” One seventy-twoyear-old farmer recalled that the cooperatives had “too many expenses (hop tac xa chi

phi nhieu qua). So if the harvest was bad then we didn’t have enough food to live on
(thu hoach thieu thap, khong du an).” Another forty-seven-year-old farmer who served
on the village People’s Committee said that “the upper levels of the state didn’t know
anything about agriculture (cap tren nha nuoc khong biet nong nghiep).”28
All interview subjects said that they greatly preferred private production to the
collective labor in the cooperatives. According to a fifty-one-year-old woman, Resolution
10 meant that “if you work a lot, then you have a lot; if you work a little, you have little
(ai lam nhieu thi nhieu, ai lam it thi it).” A forty-five-year-old farmer who served on the
village’s People’s Committee believed that “the cooperative was a waste of time. [Now]
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there’s a lot of trade. Farmers have the initiative in production; things are balanced.
There’s alcohol to drink, food to eat, and better health.” A thirty-year-old farmer who
had served in the army said that after the promulgation of Resolution 10 life had shifted
to “self-production and consumption . . . you don’t have to hand everything over to the
state. Before Doi Moi, you couldn’t grow what you wanted [because] the cooperative
decided everything. Everyone had to grow one thing, even if other crops grew better or
were more profitable. Life is much better now, because prior to Doi Moi, rice production
was always low and the state ran everything. Now production is a lot higher. . . .
Compared with 10 years ago, living conditions have improved five times over.”29
Survey results indicated that the vast majority of rural Vietnamese believed their
living standards improved after collective production in cooperatives had ended in 1988
and would continue to improve in the near future. In 1996 and 1997 over fifteen
hundred applicants to a rural micro-loan credit program administered by an American
non-governmental organization and the Women’s Union of Vietnam, a state mass
organization, were asked to rate on a scale of one to ten their living standards relative
to the average living standard in their villages before and after Doi Moi. They were also
asked to estimate on a scale of one to ten what they believed their living standards
would be relative to the average living standard in their villages in the year 2000. A
response of five meant that the applicant felt his or her living standard was equal to the
average living standard of his or her village; a response of ten meant that the applicant
felt his or her living standard was the highest in the village. This method of asking
subjects to rate their living standards was used in previous studies in Vietnam and
provided “a subjective assessment of the quality of rural Vietnamese life as perceived by
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rural Vietnamese” independent of external observation. The method was pilot-tested in
my interviews and was easily understood by all subjects.30
On average, applicants believed that their living standards had improved
significantly since the beginning of Doi Moi. Over 80 percent of the applicants who
stated that their main source of income was agriculture believed their living standards
were below average prior to Doi Moi. At the time of the survey, only 12 percent of the
applicants believed their living standards were above their village’s average living
standard; however, over 79 percent felt their living standards would be above average
by the year 2000. Similar results were found when applicants were grouped by
geographic region (northern, central, or southern Vietnam), income level, education
level, amount of land cultivated by the applicant’s household, and the amount of labor
possessed by the applicant’s household. Statistical analysis demonstrated that these
variables were not significantly associated with the amount applicants believed their
living standards had improved since the end of collective production or with the amount
they believed their living standards would improve in the near future. The only group
that on average reported lower living standards after Doi Moi was composed of the 7
percent of respondents who identified themselves as unemployed, and this group felt
that their relative living standards had declined by an average of only 1 percent.31
Collectivization was the norm, not the exception, in communist states during the
twentieth century. Communist leaders thought that collectivization would facilitate rapid
industrialization of agrarian economies by bringing rural populations “under the political
control of the state.” Through collectivization, farmers could be forced to supply
agricultural goods to the state at below market prices, and they could also be forced to
buy industrial and consumer goods at artificially high prices. The capital thus bled from
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the countryside could be used by the state for industrial investment, either by exporting
state-appropriated agricultural goods to earn foreign exchange, or by supplying food at
subsidized prices to urban factory workers to reduce industrial labor costs.32
Reality was very different. In the Soviet Union under Stalin, mass terror,
starvation, and killings made it possible for the state to disregard human and economic
consequences, but in other communist states there was a distinct difference “between
the power of the state to formulate policy and the ability of the state to implement it.”
The economic growth that did occur in these states was caused primarily by the
misallocation of resources and a disregard of costs. Preventing decreases in agricultural
production required an increasingly larger amount of state-supplied economic resources,
and improving the efficiency of collectivized agriculture proved “difficult, if not
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impossible.” 33
In Vietnam, collectivized agriculture lacked enough economic incentives for it to
be supported by farmers. Vietnamese farmers resisted collective production and instead
focused their energies on private production, which had greater economic rewards.
Despite changes to its policies, the VCP failed to make collective production attractive to
farmers and eventually the party was forced to abandon its policy of collectivization
altogether and permit unfettered private production for the free market.
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<H>Figure 1: Annual Per Capita Rice Production Under Collectivization in
Vietnam.</H>
Sources: Tong Cuc Tong Ke, So Lieu Thong Ke Nong Nghiep, 35 Nam, 1956=-1990
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